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<a>2.1<em>Why a right to housing? 
Housing provides and protects some of our most fundamental needs. It shields us from the 
elements and provides refuge from external physical threats. It gives us a base from which to 
build a livelihood and take part in the community, from the neighbourhood to the state. 
Moreover, housing provides a space in which our psychological needs can be met and 
fostered. As I have explored elsewhere, housing is important in the formation and protection 
of identity, community and place in the world (Hohmann, 2013).  
The recognition of the right to housing in law is based on an appreciation of the 
importance of housing to privacy, autonomy and freedom; its function in facilitating 
participation and inclusion in society; and its role in providing the material goods that make 
all of these things meaningful and possible. In other words, the principles that inform and 
underlie the right to housing include some of the most fundamental concerns of human rights 
(Hohmann, 2013). Moreover, while aspects of a person’s relationship with her housing and 
home may be protected by rights to privacy, property, liberty and security, by rights to vote 
and to freedom of expression, a right to housing shifts the focus, insisting that housing is not 
instrumental to the realization of other human needs and goods, but itself fundamental 
(Hohmann, 2013). 
If we understand the right to housing in this way, we are faced with a complex and 
multifaceted right, which touches on the relationship between the individual and the state, the 
public and the private, inclusion and exclusion. Its realization is deeply affected by and tied 




When I began my PhD on the right to housing in 2005, a frequent response to my 
research was that the right to housing wasn’t really a human right at all: it was insufficiently 
fundamental, insufficiently universal, and of relevance only in developing country contexts. 
The right is now appreciated as fundamental to a decent human life, seen as a universal need, 
and recognized as a right that is violated in the richest, as well as poorest, states. Meanwhile, 
it is harnessed by social movements and activists contesting the seemingly relentless 
commodification and financialization of housing; the privatization of public goods and space; 
and the spatial, social, and economic marginalization of communities who fail to fit the ideal 
of neoliberal consumer citizen. 
The increasing recognition of the fundamental importance of the right to housing is 
tied to increasingly stark violations of it. In cities such as Sydney, Hong Kong and London, 
those jewels in the crown of globalization, housing is increasingly unaffordable, as it 
becomes financialized and hooked into global markets where its worth and purpose are 
divorced from the needs of those who live in it (Langley, 2008; Rolnik, 2013; also see 
Chapters 3 and 4). At the same time, in these and in other places, from Cape Town to Bogota, 
informal settlements are bulldozed and poor or minority neighbourhoods ‘regenerated’, to 
make way for mega-events or city beautification. Social or subsidised housing is left to 
crumble, its residents increasingly seen as non-productive and therefore as falling short as 
citizens (Malpass & Murie, 1982, p. 174). In rural settings, indigenous and peasant 
communities, for whom a right to housing includes deep attachments to and knowledge of 
land and place, are displaced by extractive industries, ‘conservation’ and agricultural land-
grabbing (Murphy et al., 2017, p. 687). The vignettes that follow illustrate two manifestations 
of violations of the right to housing, which are related to each other, and to broader 
phenomena such as global inequality, privatization and financialization, phenomena which 





<a>2.2<em>The violation of the right to housing: two vignettes 
<b>2.2.1<em>The Grenfell Tower Fire: June 2017, London, UK 
In the early hours of 14 June 2017, the 24 storey Grenfell Tower was engulfed in fire. 
Although located in an affluent area of London, Grenfell was a residential building bearing 
the aesthetic hallmarks, and ideological ‘baggage’, of the UK’s post-war high-rise social 
housing (Hanley, 2012). More than 70 people caught in the blaze were burned to death or 
died from their injuries. Flames spread rapidly, fuelled by combustible insulation which was 
a component of new cladding, applied to the building primarily to ‘update its look’ when 
viewed from the affluent homes surrounding it (Griffin, 2017). This cladding, which was 
cheaper than other options, was not rigorously tested for fire safety, and should not have been 
able to pass building regulations (Pasha-Robinson, 2018). The tower’s mainly working class 
or lower-income residents had struggled repeatedly to make their concerns about the safety 
and adequacy of their housing heard (Hastie, 2017; Foster, 2017). The rights – and ultimately 
lives – of the tower’s inhabitants were sacrificed to a combination of deep cuts to social 
housing and the social goods and benefits that support it (from welfare payments to access to 
legal aid), disinvestment in its upkeep despite the stunning wealth surrounding it, and explicit 
and implicit disclaiming of responsibility for it, and its inhabitants. 
The devastating fire has exposed the challenges posed to realizing a right to housing 
in the face of the deregulation and privatization of public goods, services and space. It has 
shone a light on the lack of care for marginalized and poor communities (also see Chapter 9). 
At the same time, the right to housing has emerged as a potent strand in protests demanding 
justice for Grenfell, which connect the disastrous event with broader movements seeking to 






<b>2.2.2<em>Forced evictions for carbon trading, Uganda, February 2010 
Mubende and Kibonga, Uganda, have long been settled by subsistence farmers whose 
patterns of land use and ownership map uneasily onto dominant (neo)liberal conceptions of 
property rights (Murphy et al., 2017, pp. 681–2). These communities supported themselves 
with pride. One displaced resident recalls ‘I remember my land, three acres of coffee, many 
trees – mangoes and avocados … two beautiful permanent houses. My land gave me 
everything from my living to my children’s education. People use to call me Omataka, 
someone who owns land … [but] I am one of the poorest now’ (quoted in Grainger & Geary, 
2011, p. 2).  
Characterizing the inhabitants as backward and primitive, in 2005 the Ugandan 
government granted licences to UK based New Forests Company to create timber plantations 
in Mubende and Kibonga, which Uganda planned to trade for carbon credits on the global 
market (Kron, 2011). The World Bank, itself an investor in the scheme, considers that 
Uganda’s policies provide a model climate for economic development and foreign investment 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2004; World Bank, 2015), and its 
participation echoes and recreates colonial histories of ‘socially constructed resource scarcity’ 
(Murphy et al., 2017 p. 679). 
Residents, characterized as ‘illegal encroachers’, were pressured to leave. On 28 
February 2010, while the community of Kicucula were at Church, police arrived and 
executed a brutal forced eviction, one of a string of violent acts of intimidation. Schools and 
communities were destroyed, homes and possessions burnt, and people beaten and killed 
(Grainger & Geary, 2011; Kron, 2011). Families, once self-sufficient, were forced off their 
land and out of their homes. As many as 22,500 people were evicted, now living a precarious 




where cycles of immiseration and forced urbanization and migration are perpetuated 
(Carmody & Taylor, 2016). 
The backdrop to the evictions and the ‘knock-on’ rights violations is a national land 
policy that aims to transform Uganda ‘from a peasant society to a modern, industrialised and 
urbanised society’ and to ensure that it protects the rights of citizens ‘to own land which 
should be optimally utilised’ (Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban 
Development, 2013, p. iii). 
In the face of such deprivation and violation what can the right to housing as 
enshrined in international human rights law, or in national constitutions ‘do’? How can it be 
harnessed by those of us seeking to contest the deracination, commodification and 
marginalization of our neighbours and fellow citizens? 
In the sections that follow, I provide a synopsis of the right to housing in international 
law, with particular attention to the potential and limitations of the legal right. I discuss the 
importance of it as a political or discursive claim, and I analyse three issues requiring 
attention: privatization, financialization and equality, which pose serious challenges for 
realizing the right. However, I argue, the right to housing also offers opportunities to contest 
and resist these pressures. As such, they provide a major research agenda going forward. 
 
<a>2.3<em>The right to housing in international law: scope, content and obligations 
Socio-economic rights, including the right to housing, are often perceived to be the poor 
cousins of the rights world. States and commentators sometimes argue they are merely moral 
exhortations, and their content is perceived to be vaguer than so-called civil and political 
rights, and thus obligations harder to define or enforce (Eide and Rosas, 2001, pp. 3–7; Bates, 




housing in international law have been given a significant degree of specificity. This has 
occurred through the work of UN expert bodies, activists, advocates and scholars. 
At the international level, the key legal framework is provided by the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which is ratified 
by 166 states, who are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the rights set out in it.2 Housing is 
included as an element of the right to an adequate standard of living, in Article 11(1): 
 
<quotation>The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization 
of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international 
co-operation based on free consent.</quotation> 
 
Housing is thus not seen in isolation, but as a building block for a life in community 
with others. The right is not one to shelter, but to adequate housing, which has been 
interpreted by the expert body overseeing ICESCR, the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR), as including the provision of seven essential elements: 
legal security of tenure; availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure; 
affordability; habitability; accessibility; location; and cultural adequacy (UNCESCR, 1991). 
These elements underpin adequate housing. 
The obligation placed on states is to take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of 
the right. It is therefore a right that requires a sensitive mix of state provision, respect for 
autonomy and the facilitation of the flourishing of widely differently situated individuals, 






<quotation>Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.</quotation> 
 
An early commentator described Article 2(1) as so ‘convoluted’ and ‘intractable’ as to 
render it ‘virtually impossible to determine the precise nature of the obligations’ (Craven, 
1995, p. 151). 
However, as I show below, it is now clear that states have a number of hard obligations, 
some of which are immediate in nature; and that the scope of the right, while sufficiently 
elastic to allow growth and change, is also sufficiently clear that both political and legal 
claims may usefully be made under it. 
First, states have immediate obligations to ensure that every individual enjoys each 
element of the right to the level of a ‘minimum core’. For instance, street homelessness 
clearly violates the minimum core of the right, as do forced evictions (UNCESCR, 1991, 
1997), though in many respects the minimum core remains contested as a concept and 
difficult to apply in practice (Young, 2008). The right must immediately be ensured without 
discrimination (ICESCR Art 2(2)). In addition, any aspect of the right that does not impose 
significant resource obligations should be fulfilled without delay. This would include the 
repeal of discriminatory laws or a requirement for states to refrain from penalizing informal 
settlers. 
Second, states must devote maximum available resources to the realization of the right. 
Resources should be conceived broadly. They include not only ‘the budget’, but other 




encompass human, technological, organizational, natural and informational resources (Elson, 
Balakrishnan & Heintz, 2014 p. 14). 
The obligation to devote maximum available resources to the realization of the right to 
housing – as well as other socio-economic rights – raises considerable difficulty, both 
conceptually and practically. How, for instance, should a state balance competing demands – 
should it use its resources towards more medical equipment or more emergency housing for 
example? Can a state use its resources to invest in (potential) future rights fulfilment – 
perhaps through austerity measures, or forms of taxation – that lead to violations in the 
present, and if so, what level of future certainty of rights enjoyment is required? On this 
point, in a recent case under the ICESCR, the Spanish state’s argument that the sell-off of 
badly needed social housing would enhance GDP in future, and thus was a measure leading 
in the long run to better standards of living, was rejected (M.D.B. v Spain, 2017). And the 
question of who should have decision-making power – a court, executive or legislature – has 
long dogged socio-economic rights (Mazibuko v. Johannesburg, 2009; King, 2012). While 
these questions have not been answered in full, it is clear that states can adopt different 
strategies to fit their situations – they have a ‘margin of appreciation’ in their choice of means 
to fulfil the right (UNCESCR, 2007). However, they should be held closely to account for 
policy or budgetary decisions that are arbitrary or discriminatory in nature, or that fail to 
consider the disadvantaged and marginalized, the most vulnerable, and those in situations of 
grave risk (UNCESCR, 2007). Where there are various policy options open to the state, the 
state should choose a course that is the least detrimental to peoples’ rights (UNCESCR, 
2007). 
Third, states must make progress towards the full realization of the right. Limited 
exceptions to progressive realization include situations of natural disaster or war, as well as 




steps constitute a prima facie violation of the ICESCR, which states have the burden of proof 
to discharge (UNCESCR, 1999). Thus, the right to housing in international law imposes a 
framework that, even when states experience the most serious crises, provides ways of 
monitoring and even measuring a state’s compliance with the right (Heymann, McNeill & 
Raub, 2015). At the international level, then, the right to housing is a nuanced right, requiring 
a mix of state action and restraint, which allows individuals and communities autonomy but 
also assistance. Generally, it imposes appropriately contextual obligations on states, but is not 
devoid of hard content or obligations. 
However, such a rosy analysis belies the housing rights violated across the world. Does 
the right to housing merely make ‘unfulfilled promises’ (Klare, 2015, p. 5) which might yet 
be realized? Or worse, is it a ‘sheer irrelevance’ (UNCHR, 1993, para. 102) to those 
experiencing inadequate housing, homelessness, dispossession and deprivation across the 
world? 
International human rights are notoriously under-enforced. With few exceptions, 
international human rights treaties have no real ‘teeth’, and while they impose legal 
obligations, any efforts to make unwilling states deliver rely on political or other pressure: 
‘naming and shaming’ at the international and/or domestic level. Rights cannot be penned 
into existence. They must be fought for on the ground, on political terrain. 
Below, I consider the right to housing in two national Constitutions, which demonstrate 
both the importance of social movements and political struggles around the right to housing, 
as well as the limitations of legal victories. 
 
<a>2.4<em>Key national constitutions: South Africa and India 
Arguably the most influential codifications and interpretations of the right to housing have 




housing in international law. In particular, South Africa and India provide compelling legal 
statements on the right to housing, supported by and demonstrating the important role of 
social movements in motivating legal change, and realizing the right. 
 
<b>2.4.1<em>South Africa: rhetoric or realization? 
The post-Apartheid South African Constitution, hailed as a ‘transformative’ document with 
ambitions to remedy past wrongs and achieve social justice (Klare, 1998, p. 146), includes a 
number of socio-economic rights, among them the right to have access to adequate housing. 
The Constitution makes them fully justiciable in s 38. As under the ICESCR, the South 
African Constitution provides that the right to housing should be progressively realized, 
within the framework of available resources in s 26(2). 
In the celebrated Grootboom case of 2000, the South African Constitutional Court 
found the government’s housing policy was unreasonable because it failed to provide for the 
most marginalized and worst off of South Africa’s citizens. The Court held that the claimants 
were not entitled to any special preference in access to housing, noting that ‘hundreds of 
thousands (possibly millions) of South Africans’ lived in similar appalling circumstances 
(Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, paras 80–81). However, it 
required the state to put in place a comprehensive policy for the progressive realization of the 
right to have access to adequate housing, within available resources, including due provision 
for the worst off. In subsequent cases, the Court has confirmed that the right to housing 
requires the provision of alternative accommodation in the case of forced evictions (Residents 
of Joe Slovo Community v. Thubelisha Homes, 2010), and that the reasonableness of a policy 
may hang on whether or not the state consulted or engaged with those to be affected by it 
(Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v. City of Johannesburg, 2008), giving these rights a role in 




However, South Africa’s right to housing also demonstrates the dangers of celebrating 
rights on paper. Since the end of Apartheid, poverty has remained highly racialized, 
inequality has increased and the spatial injustice of the Apartheid era continues (Dugard, 
Madlingozi & Tissington, 2015). Irene Grootboom, in whose name the ground-breaking and 
internationally applauded case was brought, died at the age of 44, still waiting for adequate 
housing (Mbazira, 2008). Waiting lists make the prospect of state-provided adequate housing 
seem illusory for many, while the government’s readiness to bulldoze informal settlements to 
beautify the country for international visitors (Newton, 2009) calls into question its policy 
priorities for the poor and marginalized. 
The failure to realize the right cannot be placed solely at the Court’s door, but is an 
example of the fact that rights cannot be secured by a celebrated court decision alone. They 
must be fought for continuously by activists and rights holders. It must be the business of all 
branches of government to fulfil them, and private parties must respect them too. In fact, the 
right continues to be an important resource as social movements, non-governmental 
organizations, lawyers and public figures harness it as law, and as a discursive strategy 
(Dugard, Madlingozi & Tissington, 2015). In doing so, they make space to contest 
marginalization, and shine a light on injustice. 
 
<b>2.4.2<em>India: the power of judicial activism and the instability of rights 
The Indian Constitution includes economic and social rights, but expressly declares these to 
be ‘non-enforceable’ (Constitution of the Republic of India, 1950, Pt IV). Nevertheless, 
through bold judicial activism, the Indian Supreme Court has implied a right to housing, 
among other rights, into the constitutional right to life. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Supreme Court held that the right to life includes a right to livelihood, which in some 




living in informal settlements, and have prevented numerous slum clearances and evictions 
(Hohmann, 2013 pp. 108–118). 
The Indian cases express a compelling justification for the right to housing. They 
articulate that safe, secure and adequate housing plays a role in ‘physically, mentally and 
intellectually’ equipping people for democratic citizenship, while homelessness ‘frustrates the 
very object of the constitutional animation of the right to equality, economic justice, 
fundamental right to residence, dignity of the person and the right to live itself’ (Chameli 
Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1996 p. 556; see also Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal 
Corporation, 1986). The judicially implied right to housing in India protects the personal and 
public need for living conditions that enable individuals to flourish and to contribute as 
citizens. These cases also illustrate the ways that housing protects and is connected to the 
enjoyment of a host of other rights, notably the rights to life, work, vote and equality. 
The Indian example also demonstrates that rights provide an unstable discourse, 
which must constantly be underpinned by activism on the ground. In the 2000s, powerful 
middle class movements used the openness of the right to life to argue for a right to a healthy 
environment, which, they subsequently argued, required the eviction of slum dwellers from 
the cities. Informal settlers were characterized as polluters, representing a threat to human 
health and the environment (also see Chapter 6). A changed High Court bench agreed, and 
many protections that had come with a judicial recognition of the right to housing were 
stripped away in favour of other interests (Almitra Patel v Union of India, 2000; Rajamani, 
2007). 
The Indian and South African examples illustrate that the words in a constitution will 
not be determinative, and that high-profile jurisprudence may mask the underlying lack of 





<a>2.5<em>The agenda going forward 
In the sections below, I identify three complex phenomena with far-reaching social, economic 
and political implications that are stumbling blocks to the realization of the right to housing. 
These are privatization and deregulation, the financialization of housing and inequality. At 
the same time, the right to housing as a political resource and a legal standard can be used as 
one way to contest the privatization of public goods, challenge the financialization of housing 
and confront inequality. 
 
<b>2.5.1<em>Privatization 
In international human rights law, the state holds the duty to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights. Although it has duties to ensure that private actors – such as corporations or private 
citizens – do not violate the rights of others, it remains the primary duty bearer (Clapham, 
2006). Privatization, and associated practices of deregulation and contracting out, in which 
governments cede operational responsibility for formerly public functions, can be a barrier to 
holding anyone to meaningful account. We can see these challenges playing out in the 
aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, detailed above. The web of complex relationships, 
‘arm’s length’ contractual arrangements and lines of responsibility between and among 
national and local government, private contractors, social tenant residents, private owners of 
flats in the building, regulators, and public and private safety inspectors, make responsibility 
difficult to attribute in a legal sense. At the same time, the ways in which responsibility is 
diffused make startlingly visible the injustices behind austerity policies, regeneration projects 
and the neglect of social housing, premised on the state’s diminished responsibility for social 
goods and marginalized and vulnerable people (Downing, 2017; Bowie, 2017; Elliott-Cooper 
& Hubbard, 2017; Clifford, 2017; see more generally Honig, 2017). It is clear that people’s 




In a situation like the Grenfell Tower fire, the line between public accountability and 
private unaccountability in human rights becomes both blurry and thick. It is blurry because 
the distinctions between what is private and what is public, and who has responsibility for 
what, appear fungible or amorphous. It is thick because that very amorphousness clouds and 
obscures where responsibility lies, but there is also the question of why, and for whose 
benefit, relationships are arranged in ways that shift the public to the private. 
The Grenfell Tower fire demonstrates how far we are from a public commitment to 
housing as a human right, and to the provision of goods that underpin inclusion and 
participation in the state. Housing in the UK, while once a public good, is now under 
relentless pressure to be privatized. Numerous initiatives for the sale of existing housing 
stock are pursued, at the same time that strategies are employed to make social housing less 
attractive and more poorly supported (Smith, 2008). 
The loss of life that June morning has also demonstrated how the right to housing can 
offer a response to the diffusion and obfuscation of responsibility, the lack of care taken by 
the state of its people. Any discussion of a human right to housing in the UK has long been 
lacking, but in the wake of Grenfell, the UK’s Equality and Human Rights Commission 
launched an enquiry into the human rights failures around the fire (Equalities and Human 
Rights Commission, 2017). Residents and activists have mobilized to demand that housing be 
recognized as a right, rather than a commodity and investment opportunity (Focus E15; 
Justice for Grenfell), and a right to housing as a human right is becoming a rallying point for 
action on the domestic political agenda (Pidcock, 2017; JustFair, n.d.) where it has never 






Housing has always had multiple functions. It has a use value as a place to live, grow and 
shelter. And is has an exchange value. However, in recent decades, housing’s role in the 
broader economy has undergone a seismic shift. The house as asset is now the platform from 
which wealth can be generated in the global financial system (also see Chapters 3 and 4). 
Housing has been ‘financialized’, becoming ‘critical’ to, or even a ‘central pillar of’ the 
broader financial market itself (Rolnik & Rabinovich, 2014, pp. 62–63; Aalbers, 2008). 
The financialized housing system depends on speculative trading on mortgage debts. 
It is where the loan against the value of the house links in to the global financial circuit that 
economic growth through housing can be pursued. In the world of financialized housing, the 
relationship between the material (the house as security) and the immaterial (the financial 
transaction) is fleeting. It is in the very speed and number of transactions that more value is 
generated (Lojkine, 1976, p. 132). In the whirl of transactions, the owner-occupier seems to 
disappear from view as down the barrel of a telescope held to the eye in reverse. What 
happens to the owner-occupier, as a person, appears to be irrelevant to the financial system 
(Sassen, 2009). This is itself a major challenge to the recognition and realization of human 
rights, which are an emphatically human centred approach to our social reality. 
The ‘global financial crisis’ of the mid 2000s showcased spectacularly the inequalities 
at the heart of the financialized housing system, and the hidden centrality of human beings to 
it. ‘Creative’ mortgage products designed specifically for those who would normally be 
excluded from the mortgage market had enabled the selling of ‘sub-prime’ mortgages, often 
on highly disadvantageous terms (Rolnik & Rabinovich, 2014, pp. 68–69). Superficially, 
these policies appear inclusive – we can all be homeowners now – but they have the effect of 
‘redlining’ socio-economically disadvantaged households (Rolnik & Rabinovich, 2014, p. 87; 




The gulf between the financialization of housing, and housing as a human right to 
protect and ensure the dignity and equal moral worth of individuals and families is wide, and 
has led the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate housing to remark that a financialized 
housing system cannot, by its nature, ensure the right to housing of individuals (UNHRC, 
2012). 
The financialized housing system can seem too big to tackle – governments, 
international financial institutions, the global banks, myself as a mortgage holder – are all 
implicated in it. But at the same time that financialization presents a huge obstacle, the right 
to housing can provide an important critique of it. First, we can use the right to housing to 
insist that housing is for human beings first and foremost. As the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Housing has noted, financialized housing has no need for an occupier, it ‘is valuable whether 
it is vacant or occupied, lived in or devoid of life’ (UNHRC, 2017, para. 30). Housing is 
‘dehumanized’ to the point where its actual, practical use to the individuals who might live in 
it and build their lives outwards from it is of little concern (UNHRC 2017; Hohmann, 2018). 
Insisting on housing as a right can place the individual and her need for an affordable place to 
live in peace and security back in view, to contest the relentless financialization of housing. 
 
<b>2.5.3<em>Equality 
The relationship between equality and human rights has always been a thorny one, and a 
number of commentators continue to assert that human rights, including socio-economic 
rights, do not protect or lead to greater equality. Marx’s famous critique, that rights 
depoliticize claims for social justice, without providing either social justice or equality, 
continues to resonate (Marx, 1843). More recent high-profile commentators have argued that 
human rights are too easily harnessed into neo-liberal projects (Moyn, 2015, pp. 161–162) 




human rights institutions often fail to identify and challenge the structural causes of human 
rights violation, or question the neoliberal and profoundly unequal system in which violations 
occur, touching only on symptoms (Linarelli, Salomon & Sornarajah, 2018; Marks, 2011). 
Certainly, we can readily admit that having more human rights on paper has not, as yet, led to 
greater equality, particularly globally. 
For this reason, the role that human rights, specifically the right to housing, can play 
in contesting an unequal global order and in pushing towards social, political and economic 
justice, remains a major agenda which should be pursued on various fronts. 
First, scholars and policy-makers (particularly in the global North/West) must be 
prepared to pay much greater attention to the international economic and political order. For 
instance, we should ask searching questions about the connections between forced and 
violent evictions of subsistence farmers in rural Uganda, sketched in this chapter, and neo-
liberal governance based on perpetual growth, itself supported by financialized housing 
requiring ever larger, more luxurious and unaffordable (thus always mortgaged) assets 
elsewhere. We should ask what sort of citizens ‘global’ cities are built for, and what sorts of 
communities are marginalized in the process (Aust, 2018; Hohmann, 2013 Chapter 8), as well 
as what spaces – urban and rural – are constituted for those left behind (Lemanski & Marx, 
2015). 
The right to housing in international law is premised on international cooperation: 
Article 2(1) of ICESCR states that each state party ‘undertakes to take steps, individually or 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical’ towards 
achievement of the right. Article 11(1) also recognizes ‘the essential importance of 
international co-operation based on free consent’ in realizing the right to an adequate 
standard of living. The first UN Special Rapporteur on Housing understood that violation of 




These statements remind us that enjoyment of the right in local contexts cannot be achieved 
without attention to, and coordinated action around, global flows of ideas, money and people. 
The realization of rights requires international engagement and action because the enjoyment 
of comfortable living standards in some countries is achieved precisely through ongoing 
exploitation of people in others. Much needs to be done to overcome the exploitation of, for 
instance, marginalized workers (Stewart, 2012; Smith & Choudry, 2016) and colonized 
peoples (UNGA, 1974) that has produced and helps underpin the status quo. Finally, this 
remains a major agenda because the premise behind international human rights is their 
universal respect and enjoyment, and without it their promise remains hollow. 
Second is the issue of gender inequality in enjoyment of the right. While much has 
been done on this front, including recognition of women’s ‘essential homelessness’ – when 
women have no right to the home into which they are born, marry or die (UNCHR, 1995) – 
and on domestic violence as forced eviction and denial of the right to housing 
(BucknerInniss, Hohmann & Tramontana, 2019), much still remains to be done. We should 
ask ourselves whether the right to housing perpetuates an ideal of the nuclear family with 
limiting patriarchal concepts such as the family wage. We should question whether to realize 
the right to housing we need fundamentally more communal work and living arrangements, 
which drive against the perceived individualism of human rights. These questions, which may 
unsettle deep societal structures, can help us move the right to housing forward. 
Third, pushing the equality agenda under the banner of the right to housing should 
lead us to consider radical political and social agendas, from Occupy to the squatters’ 
movement (McCleave Maharawal, 2013; Vasudevan, 2017). These movements ask us to 
conceive of our relationships with the state, property, and each other in profoundly different 




its present limitations and the current myopia of human rights to the market and the state?  
The best thinking on the right to housing must dare to think well beyond the given.  
 
<a>2.6<em>Conclusion 
As the remainder of the contributions in this volume make clear, the challenges facing us in 
realizing adequate, safe and secure housing in a deeply unequal world are enormous, and 
growing. The right to housing may seem an insignificant response, at worst even a distraction 
from the real issues and other avenues for action. It is only one resource among many – 
political, legal, economic – that must be pursued. 
However, at its best, the right to housing provides powerful tools and principles which 
can guide us in this fight. First of these is the insistence that each human person is entitled to 
somewhere to live in dignity and security – a home, regardless of gender, ability to contribute 
to GDP, political persuasion or place of birth. And when a human right is recognized in law, 
the harm perpetrated against the person ceases to be an unfortunate incident of life in a 
difficult and unfair world, and becomes a violation of something which is due to that 
individual. The suffering ceases to be only a private matter and becomes the necessary 
concern of all persons. This is a powerfully inclusive vision. In addition, the right to housing 
can provide hard legal standards that can be used to hold governments to account, and to 
insist that they take action to prevent private parties from harming others. These standards are 
important, even if they do not provide solutions on their own, and must crucially be coupled 
with struggles on the ground, often repeated over and over and in the face of resistance and 
oppression. Ultimately, the power of human rights – the right to housing among them – lies in 
their transformative promise, which continues to exist even in the face of their non-
enforcement or recognition. Human rights can be used to open spaces in which new visions 




for a right to housing is worth doing, even with, or especially because of, the massive social 
ills we need to confront.  
 
<a>Notes 
                                              
1. With thanks to Christine Schöwbel-Patel for comments on the draft. I am grateful to the 
Independent Social Research Foundation for funding me as an Early Career Fellow in 2017–
2018, and to the Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales for hosting me as a Visiting 
Fellow during the writing of this paper. 
2. A right to housing is also included in a number of other international and regional human 
rights documents. These are analysed further in Hohmann (2013), part I. 
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